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SUPREME COURT TERM SPOTLIGHT: OHIO V. AMERICAN 
EXPRESS COMPANY 
Thomas J.K. Schick, News Editor 
n addition to the prominent cases addressing First Amendment,1 
searches and seizures,2 and immigration3 issues presented in the 
2017–18 term docket, the Supreme Court will also hear two im-
portant consumer law disputes with potentially major commercial 
implications.4 Not to be lost in the widespread media attention at-
                       
1 See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 
464 (2017) (granting certiorari to address whether disclosures re-
quired by a California reproductive rights law violate free speech 
protections); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (granting certiorari to address 
whether Colorado’s public accommodations law which compels a 
baker to design and make a cake that violates his religious beliefs 
about same-sex marriage violates the Free Speech or Free Exercise 
Clauses of the First Amendment.).  
2 See, e.g., Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 53 (2017) (granting certiorari to 
address whether the Fourth Amendment automobile exception per-
mits a police officer to enter private property to search a vehicle 
parked a few feet from a residence without a warrant); Carpenter v. 
United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017) (granting certiorari to address 
whether the warrantless search and seizure of cell phone location 
and movement data violates the Fourth Amendment.). 
3 See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 34 (2018) (granting certiorari to 
address, inter alia, the constitutionality of President Donald 
Trump’s 2017 proclamation restricting travel to the United States by 
citizens from eight countries.).   
4 See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017) (granting certio-
rari to address whether American Express’s anti-steering provisions 
unreasonably restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act); Epic 
Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017) (granting certiorari to 
address whether the National Labor Relations Act prohibits enforce-
ment of an agreement requiring employees to resolve disputes with 
I 
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tracted by other pending Supreme Court cases, the Court’s deci-
sion in Ohio v. American Express Company5 is poised to have great 
effects on the cardholder, merchant, and lender sides the consumer 
credit card industry. In American Express Company, the Court 
will review a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit holding that the anti-steering provisions con-
tained in merchant agreements with American Express—the sec-
ond highest volume credit card network—do not unreasonably re-
strain trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.6  
To grasp the context of the legal dispute before the Court in 
American Express Company, it is important to understand the 
basic mechanics of the credit card industry, specifically, anti-steer-
ing provisions. American Express and other credit card networks 
charge merchants a fee each time a consumer uses their card to 
make a transaction.7 Merchant fees vary by merchant and credit 
card network.8 To control how merchants treat American Express 
cardholders, American Express adopted anti-steering or “non-dis-
criminatory provisions” in their contracts with merchants.9 Anti-
steering provisions seek to prevent merchants from directing con-
sumers toward less expensive payment methods, namely, payment 
methods that charge the merchant a lower fee to process the trans-
action.10 American Express’s anti-steering provision prevents mer-
chants from, inter alia, indicating that it prefers other payment 
                       
the employer through individual arbitration under the Federal Arbi-
tration Act.). 
5 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017). 
6 United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 188, 207 (2d Cir. 2016), 
cert. granted sub nom., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 
(2017). Specifically, § 1 of the Sherman Act provides in relevant part 
that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.” 15 
U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (emphasis added).  
7 See id. at 188–89. 
8 See id. 
9 See id. at 190–91. 
10 See id. at 191–92; see also Steven Semerano, Settlement Without Con-
sent: Assessing the Credit Card Merchant Fee Class Action, 2015 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 186, 204 (2015). 
17.Schick (News).docx (Do Not Delete) 5/4/18  7:35 PM 
298 Loyola Consumer Law Review Vol. 30:2 
methods over American Express, dissuading cardholders from us-
ing American Express, and persuading American Express card-
holders to use another form of payment.11 Use of anti-steering pro-
visions seeks to benefit both American Express and consumers 
because “[c]ertainty that [American Express] cards will be accepted 
makes the network more attractive to cardholders—and, in turn, 
cardholders’ use of the [American Express] network makes its 
cards more attractive for merchants to accept.”12  
In 2010, the United States and seventeen states sued Amer-
ican Express, Visa, and MasterCard in a New York District Court 
for their use of anti-steering provisions that the plaintiffs argued 
unreasonably restrained trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman 
Act.13 In 2014, American Express proceeded to trial after Visa and 
MasterCard entered into consent judgments and voluntarily with-
drew their anti-steering provisions.14 Following a seven week 
bench trial before District Judge Nicholas Garaufis, the District 
Court found that American Express violated antitrust laws.15 No-
tably, the District Court also found that American Express’s anti-
steering provisions “resulted in increased prices for consumers . . . 
[because] [m]erchants facing increased credit card acceptance costs 
will pass most, if not all, of their additional costs along to their cus-
tomers in the form of higher retail prices.”16 The District Court per-
manently enjoined American Express from enforcing its anti-steer-
ing provision for ten years.17 
On September 26, 2016, the Second Circuit reversed the in-
junction against American Express and held that the anti-steering 
provisions did not violate § 1 of the Sherman Act.18 In applying the 
“rule of reason” burden-shifting test, the Second Circuit held that 
the relevant market included both the market for general purpose 
                       
11 See Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 191. 
12 Id. at 192.  
13 See id.  
14 See id.  
15 See id. 
16 United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom., 
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017).   
17 See Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 193.   
18 See id. at 183. 
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credit and charge card network services, as well as the market for 
cardholders.19 The Second Circuit noted that the District Court 
erred in not sufficiently embracing the “two-sided market” features 
of the credit card industry in its market definition, and held that 
“[t]his was error because the price charged to merchants neces-
sarily affects cardholder demand, which in turn has a feedback ef-
fect on merchant demand (and thus influences the price charged to 
merchants).”20 Additionally, the Second Circuit held that eliminat-
ing American Express’s anti-steering provisions would likely in-
crease the market shares of Visa and MasterCard.21 Lastly, the Sec-
ond Circuit held that “[t]he District Court’s erroneous market 
definition caused its anticompetitive effects finding to come up 
short, for it failed to consider the two-sided net price accounting 
for the effects of the [anti-steering provisions] on both merchants 
and cardholders.”22 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on Oc-
tober 16, 2017.23  
The Court’s anticipated American Express Company deci-
sion will have significant financial implications to consumers and 
merchants. Petitioners and merchants hope that a victory at the 
Supreme Court will allow them to chip away at the $50 billion 
amount of fees paid to credit card companies annually.24 Consum-
ers will be similarly affected as concerns about the impact of anti-
                       
19 See id. at 194, 196–97. Stated another way, the Second Court concluded 
by holding that “[t]he District Court erred here in focusing entirely 
on the interests of merchants while discounting the interests of card-
holders.” Id. at 206. 
20 Id. at 200. The Second Circuit noted that the credit card industry is a 
“two-sided market” because “cardholders benefit from holding a 
card only if that card is accepted by a wide range of merchants, and 
merchants benefit from accepting a card only if a sufficient number 
of cardholders use it.” Id. at 185–86. 
21 See id. at 204. As of 2013, the Second Circuit stated that the credit card 
transaction volume was shared as follows: Visa (45%), American Ex-
press (26.4%), MasterCard (23.3%), and Discover (5.3%). See id. at 
188. 
22 Id. at 204. 
23 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017). 
24 See Greg Stohr, American Express Fee Accusations Get U.S. High Court 
Hearing, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 16, 2016), https://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2017-10-16/american-express-fee-accusa-
tions-get-u-s-supreme-court-hearing.   
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steering provisions on raising prices remain.25 The ubiquity of 
credit cards as a primary payment method in the consumer econ-
omy raises the stakes further, especially considering that approxi-
mately twenty-two billion credit card transactions are made each 
year totaling more than $2 trillion.26 On the other hand, American 
Express will continue to rely on the Second Circuit’s holding that 
the relevant market includes both merchants and cardholders, and 
that Petitioners’ reliance on evidence of price increases caused by 
anti-steering provisions “does not show competitive harm,” but ra-
ther “is perfectly consistent with vibrant competition.”27 Notably, 
while a party to the case before the Second Circuit, the United 
States did not join the appeal to the Supreme Court; however, the 
United States did file a brief in support of the Petitioners.28 
At the end of the day, the largest concern for consumers re-
garding the American Express Company case is presumably the 
potential impact lawful anti-steering provisions may have on 
prices of goods and services.29 This case illustrates the intersection 
                       
25 See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 216 (holding that American Ex-
press’s anti-steering provisions “resulted in increased prices for con-
sumers”); see also Brief for The American Antitrust Institute as Ami-
cus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., No. 
16-1454 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2017) (“Accepting the logic of the court of ap-
peals would raise the burden on plaintiffs to show unlawful monop-
olization by a dominant platform even when the firm engages in ex-
clusion for the sole purpose of raising prices or deterring 
innovation.”); Brief for The Merchant Advisory Group as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., No. 16-
1454 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2017) (“If Amex is successful in exempting its an-
ticompetitive practices from antitrust liability, it will be the mer-
chants, their employees, and American consumers who literally pay 
the price.”); Brief for the United States Supporting Petitioners at 31, 
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., No. 16-1454 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2017) (“Retail 
consumers bear the ultimate economic burden of the anti-steering 
rules.”). 
26 See Stohr, supra note 24. 
27 Brief for Respondents at 3, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., No. 16-1454 (U.S. 
Jan. 16, 2018). 
28 See Stohr, supra note 24 (noting that the “Trump administration said 
that, while the appeals court ruling was wrong, the case didn’t meet 
the Supreme Court’s usual standards for review.”); see also Brief for 
the United States, supra note 25. 
29 See Brief for The Merchant Advisory Group, supra note 25; Brief for the 
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of law and economics and their respective evaluations of what is 
just and equitable in the American credit card market. Focusing 
on the Court’s canon of antitrust analysis, the Court’s decision will 
likely clarify the proper market definition for the credit card indus-
try and other two-sided markets.30 Because this case will likely de-
termine whether credit card companies can use anti-steering pro-
visions in their merchant agreements, particular attention should 
be paid to measuring the actual effect of the Court's decision on 
competition and prices. 
 
 
                       
United States, supra note 25. 
30 See supra note 20; see also United States Telecom Ass’n v. Fed. 
Commc’ns Comm’n, 825 F.3d 674, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Williams, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the market 
for broadband internet access may be two-sided, and that “[t]he an-
swer to the question may well shed light on the reasonableness of the 
[Federal Communications Commission] regulations” at issue in that 
case), petition for cert. filed, Sept. 28, 2017.  
